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One privacy issue is the client’s privacy. In order to query
the data warehouse, a user usually requests the server to perform
OLAP operations and send back a cell. An important issue in this
simple process is represented by the privacy of the user query
as the user query may reveal to the server business sensitive
information. For example, for a stock exchange data warehouse,
the user may be an investor, who queries the data warehouse for
the trend of a certain stock. He may wish to keep private the
identity of the stock he is interested in. For a pharmaceutical data
warehouse, the user may be a laboratory, which would like to
keep private the active principles it wants to use. To protect his
privacy, the user accessing a data warehouse may therefore want
to perform OLAP operations and retrieve a cell without revealing
any information about which cell he is interested in.
A trivial solution to the above private data warehouse query
problem is for the user to download the entire data warehouse
and then locally perform OLAP operations and retrieve the cell
of interest. This solution is not suitable if the owner of the data
warehouse wishes to make profit through data warehouse services
(for example, a health care data warehouse). Usually, the user is
interested in only a part of the data warehouse. Purchasing the
entire data warehouse may not be an economically viable.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols, such as [11],
[25], do not fully address the private data warehouse query
problem. A PIR protocol allows a user to retrieve a record from
a database without the owner of that database being able to
determine which record was selected with communication cost
less than the database size. By using PIR, a user can retrieve a cell
(a record) from a data warehouse (a database) without revealing
any information about which cell is retrieved. However, the user
cannot hide his OLAP operations to the server when he requests
the server to perform the operations. These operations may reveal
the user’s interest. For example, when the user requests the server
to perform a slice operation with respect to a location, the server
can learn the user’s interest in the location. It is a challenge to
assure the user’s privacy when performing OLAP operations.
Another privacy issue with data warehouse queries is the
server’s privacy. Usually, data warehouse is built for certain busi-
ness purposes and the owner of data warehouse (server) wishes to
make profit by offering data warehouse query services, such as one
query per pay. The server has to disclose some data to the client
when the client queries the data warehouse, but the server wants to
keep the rest of the data private. The service’s privacy was called
the server’s security in [41]. Security of a databased server usually
refers to securing network against hackers. To avoid confusion, it
is better to use the server’s privacy term.
In our previous work [41], we gave a solution for private
data warehouse queries on the basis of Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN)
[7] cryptosystem. Our basic idea is to allow the data warehouse
owner to encrypt its data warehouse and distribute the encrypted
data warehouse to the user who wishes to perform private data
warehouse queries. The user can perform any OLAP operations
on the encrypted data warehouse locally without revealing his
interest. When the user wishes to decrypt a cell of the encrypted
data warehouse, the user and the server run a Private Cell Retrieval
(PCR) protocol jointly to decrypt the cell without revealing to the
server which cell is retrieved.
Unlike operational databases, a data warehouse is non-volatile.
The data in the data warehouse is never over-written or deleted
- once committed; the data is static, read-only, and retained for
future reporting. It is feasible to allow the data warehouse owner
to distribute the encrypted data warehouse to potential users only
once and let the users download new added data online if any.
Assume that the server charges the client per query, our
solution based on the BGN cryptosystem [41] allows the user to
perform some statistical analysis, such as regression and variance
analysis, on the encrypted data warehouse with the lowest cost.
The reason is that the BGN cryptosystem allows one to evaluate
multi-variate polynomials of total degree 2 on encrypted values.
However, it needs relatively long time to decrypt a ciphertext,
which is an encryption of a large plaintext.
To overcome this problem, we give a solution for private cell
retrieval from data warehouse on the basis of the Paillier public
key cryptosystem [35] in this paper. This solution is faster than
our solution based on BGN cryptosystem.
To enhance our solutions for private data warehouse queries,
we also give an approach for private block download (PBD) on the
basis of the Paillier cryptosystem [35]. Our PBD protocol allows
a client to download a block from the encrypted data warehouse
without revealing which block is downloaded. If the client cannot
get the entire encrypted data warehouse and he is interested in only
one block of the data warehouse, he can download the block from
the server with our PBD protocol and then retrieve cells from the
block with our PCR protocol. In this way, our PBD protocol can
improve the feasibility of our private data warehouse queries. Our
PBD protocol can be used to perform dice or slice operation on
the encrypted data warehouse in the server side without revealing
to the server which block of the data warehouse is retrieved.
Our solutions ensures both the server’s privacy in the sense
that the server, for billing purpose, releases to the user data paid
by the user, and the client’s privacy in the sense that the client does
not reveal any information about his queries to the server. We have
implemented our solution on an example of data warehouse and
experiments have shown that our solution is practical for private
data warehouse queries.
This paper extends our previous paper [41] by including a new
PCR protocol based on the Paillier cryptosystem to improve the
performance and a new PBD protocol to reduce the size of the
encrypted data warehouse that the client has to download. This is
a significant extension that enhances the flexibility and efficiency
of our approach. In this paper we also analyze the security and
complexity of such protocols. A combination of our PBD and
PCR protocol has comparable performance against existing PIR
protocols. Furthermore, we model multiple queries with both our
PCR and PBD protocols and analyze the client’s privacy with
multiple queries.
Our solutions for private data warehouse queries can be
adapted to the cloud computing environment, where the data
warehouse owner outsources the encrypted data cube to the
cloud and the outsourced cloud server provides the private block
download service to the client. The cloud server does not know the
decryption key of the data warehouse owner and thus the privacy
of the data warehouse can be preserved. The data warehouse owner
is needed only when the client wants to decrypt a ciphertext
through our private cell retrieval. As shown in our performance
analysis, our private cell retrieval can be done efficiently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work
is surveyed in Section 2. We define our model and described
our solution from Sections 3 to 4. The security and performance
analysis is carried out in Sections 5 and 6. Experimental results
are shown in Section 7. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
































































A closely related work is Private Information Retrieval (PIR),
which was firstly introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and
Sudan in 1995 [11]. In their paper, they proposed a set of schemes
to implement PIR through replicated databases, which provide
users with information - theoretic security as long as some of
the database replicas do not collude against the user. Since then,
a lot of research on PIR has been done. We classify the results as
follows [3], [34].
Information-Theoretic Private Information Retrieval
“Information-theoretic” stands for the fact that the user privacy
is assumed to be unbreakable independently from the computa-
tional power of a cheater. Chor et al. proved, that any information-
theoretic PIR solution has a communication cost with a lower
bound equal to the database size [11]. Then they relaxed the
problem setting and assumed that there are several (instead of
one) database servers, which do not communicate among each
other, storing with the same data. This assumption makes the non-
trivial information-theoretic PIR feasible. The basic idea is to send
several queries to several databases. The queries are constructed in
such a way, that they give no information to the servers about the
record that the user is interested in. But using the answers from
the queries, the user can construct the desired record. Chor et al.
also considered the case when up to t of the servers are allowed
to collude against the user.
Ambainis [1] improved the results of Chor et al. [11], which
led to two non-trivial information-theoretic PIR solutions: (1) a k
database scheme (i.e., a scheme with k identical databases non-
communicating to each other), for any constant k ≥ 2, with
communication complexity O(N1/(2k−1)); and (2) a Θ(logN)
database scheme with communication complexity O(log2N ·
log logN), where N is the size of the database. Further research
on information-theoretic PIR appeared in [5], [22], [22], [23], [24].
Computational Private Information Retrieval
In order to get better communication complexity, the compu-
tational assumption was weakened by Chor and Gilboa in [10].
“Computational” means that the database servers are presumed to
be computationally bounded, i.e., under an appropriate intractabil-
ity assumption, the database cannot gain information about which
data element was selected by the user. For every ǫ > 0, Chor and
Gilboa presented two computational PIR schemes with complexity
O(N ǫ).
In the first paper on PIR [11] it was proven that the
information-theoretic PIR problem has no non-trivial solutions
for the case of a single database. Surprisingly, the substitution of
an information-theoretic security with an intractability assumption
achieves a non-trivial PIR protocol for single database scheme
[25]. Its communication complexity is O(N ǫ) for any ǫ > 0.
They use an intractability assumption described in [19]. The
basic approach is to encrypt a query in such a way that the
server still can process it using special algorithms. However,
the server recognizes neither the clear-text query nor the result.
The result can be decrypted only by the user. This was the first
single-database protocol that considers database privacy. Using
another intractability assumption, Cachin et al. [8] demonstrated
a single database computational PIR protocol that has poly-
logarithmic communication. This is an improvement compared
with the polynomial communication complexity in [25]. This
result looks particularly effective, because the user has to send
a minimum logN bits just to address the bit he wants to retrieve
in the database. Protocols with better results appeared in [9], [15],
[27], [28]. Recently, Yi et al. [40] proposed a single-database PIR
with computational efficiency on the basis of the state of the art
fully homomorphic encryption technique [13], [16], [38].
Symmetrical Private Information Retrieval
Symmetrical PIR is a PIR problem, where the privacy of the
database is considered, i.e., a symmetrical PIR protocol must pre-
vent the user from learning more than one database record of the
database during a session. Clearly, symmetrical privacy (database
privacy) is a very important property for practical applications,
since an efficient billing is only then possible. A symmetrical PIR
protocol for single server was first proposed in [26], and for several
servers it was considered in [17]. Other symmetrical PIR were
proposed in [30], [31], [32].
In addition, Private Block Retrieval (PBR) is a natural ex-
tension of PIR in which, instead of retrieving only a single bit,
the user retrieves a d-bit block that begins at an index i. PBR
techniques are important for making PIR practical. Information-
theoretic PBR was introduced in [10]. A practical PBR protocol
for a single database was given by Gentry and Ramzan [15]. The
security of this scheme is based on a simple variant of the Φ-
hiding number-theoretic assumption by Cachin, Micali and Stadler
[8]. This scheme has communication complexity O(k + d) only,
where k ≥ logN is a security parameter that depends on the
database size N and d is the bit-length of the retrieved database
block.
With PIR or PBR, a user can retrieve a cell from a data
warehouse without revealing any information about which cell is
retrieved. However, the user cannot hide his OLAP operations to
the server when he requests the server to perform the operations.
These operations may reveal the user’s interest. In fact, the server
can predict the most likely next queries by formulating OLAP
queries of the user [4].
3 MODELS FOR PRIVATE DATA WAREHOUSE
QUERIES
In this section, we construct two models for private data warehouse
queries. One model is for private cell retrieval and another model
is for private block download.
3.1 Model for Private Cell Retrieval
In this model, we consider a data cube D with d dimensions
y1, y2, · · · yd and t measures x1, x2, · · · , xt, denoted as
D = (x1, x2, · · · , xt)y1,y2,··· ,yd ,
where the data cube dimension domain DD = DD1 ×DD2 ×
· · ·DDd and DDi is the domain of dimension yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
We assume that the data cube is managed by a server S
and used by clients. The server S wishes to make a profit by
providing data warehouse services to clients. The clients wish to
learn some knowledge from D through OLAP operations on D
without revealing their interests to S .
First of all, on input of a security parameter κ, the server
S generates its public/private key pair {PK,SK} and encrypts
the data cube D into E(D) with the public key PK , where the
values of all measure attributes are encrypted, but the values of
all dimension attributes are in plaintexts. The encrypted data cube
E(D) can be then released to clients.



























































































































































































obtain (Qb,j , sb,j) = QG(Ab,j , PK) (in the case of
PCR) or (Qb,j , skb,j) = QG(b, CRj , nj , PK) (in the
case of PBR), where j = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ and sb,j and
skb,j are the secrets of the challenger C, and then sends
Qb,1, Qb,2, · · · , Qb,ℓ back to the adversary A.
(3) The adversary A can experiment with the code of Qb,1,
Qb,2, · · · , Qb,ℓ in an arbitrary non-black-box way, and
finally outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if b′ = b and loses otherwise. We
define the adversaryA’s advantage in this game to be AdvA(k) =
|Pr(b′ = b)− 1/2|, where k is the security parameter.
Definition 3 (Client’s Privacy Definition for Multiple Queries)
In multiple queries with PCR/PBD protocols, the client has (se-
mantic) query privacy if for any probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary A, we have that AdvA(k) in the above game is a
negligible function, where the probability is taken over coin-tosses
of the challenger and the adversary.
4 PRIVATE DATA WAREHOUSE QUERIES
In this section, we construct a private cell retrieval (PCR) protocol
according to our PCR model and a private block download (PBD)
protocol according to our PBD model. Then we describe how
to perform private OLAP operations over the encrypted data
warehouse.
4.1 Paillier-Based Private Cell Retrieval Protocol
Based on our PCR model, we gave a construction of PCR protocol
based on the BNG cryptosystem [7] in [41], which allows the
client to retrieve a measure value in a cell without revealing the
measure and cell attributes to the server. Now we give a new
construction of PCR protocol based on the Paillier cryptosystem
[35]. We consider a data cube D with d dimensions y1, y2, · · · yd
and t measures x1, x2, · · · , xt, denoted as
D = (x1, x2, · · · , xt)y1,y2,··· ,yd .
Our PCR protocol based on the Paillier homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme [35] assumes that the server S randomly chooses
two large primes p, q on the basis of a security parameter κ, lets
SK = {p, q} and PK = {g,N}, where g is chosen from ZN2
and its order is a nonzero multiple of N . Before releasing the data
cube to clients, the server S runs the Initialisation algorithm to
encrypt the data cube D to E(D), as described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Initialisation (Server)
Input: D = (x1, x2, · · · , xt)y1,y2,··· ,yd , PK
Output: E(D) = (E(x1), E(x2), · · · , E(xt))y1,y2,··· ,yd
1: Let E(D) = D
2: For each measure value x = (xi)y1,y2,··· ,yd in E(D), where
1 ≤ i ≤ t and (y1, y2, · · · , yd) ∈ DD, where DD is the
dimension domain.
3: { Pick a random integer r from {1, 2, · · · , N}
4: Encrypt x by computing
z = Encrypt(x, PK) = gxrN (mod N2)
and replace (xi)y1,y2,··· ,yd with z, denoted as
(E(xi))y1,y2,··· ,yd , where the encryption algorithm is
based on the Paillier cryptosystem [35].
5: } //End of For
6: return E(D)
Given the encrypted data cube E(D), if a client C wishes to
retrieve a measure value in a cell, in other words, to decrypt a
ciphertext C in a cell, the client C and the server S run our Private
Cell Retrieval protocol, composed of three algorithms, Query Gen-
eration (QG), Response Generation (RG), and Response Retrieval
(RR), as in Algorithms 2-4.
Algorithm 2 PCR Query Generation QG (Client)
Input: C,PK
Output: Q, s
1: Pick a random integer s from {1, 2, · · · , N}
2: Compute Q = Cs(mod N2)
3: return (Q, s)
Algorithm 3 PCR Response Generation RG (Server)
Input: Q,SK = {p, q}
Output: R
1: Let λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1)
2: Compute




where the decryption algorithm is based on the Paillier cryp-
tosystem [35].
3: return R
Algorithm 4 PCR Response Retrieval RR (Client)
Input: R,PK, s
Output: m
1: Compute m = R · s−1(mod N)
2: return m
Theorem 1 (Correctness) Our Paillier-based PCR protocol is
correct. In other words, for any security parameter κ, for any
ciphertext C ,
Decrypt(C, SK) = RR(R,PK, s)
holds, where (Q, s) = QG(C,PK) and R = RG(Q,SK).
Proof We assume that C = gm
′
rN (mod N2). With reference to
[35], we have Decrypt(C, SK) = m′. In addition,
Q = Cs = (gm
′
rN )s = gm
′s(rs)N (mod N2).
Therefore, R = Decrypt(Q,SK) = m′s(mod N) and we have
RR(R,PK, s) = R · s−1 = m′s · s−1 = m′(mod N), i.e.,
Decrypt(C, SK) = RR(R,PK, s). The theorem is proved. △
Our Paillier-based PCR protocol does not require the client to
compute the discrete logarithm and thus is more efficient than our
BGN-based PCR protocol.
4.2 Private Block Download Protocol
Based on our PBD model, we give a construction of the PBD
protocol which allows the client to download a block from the
encrypted data warehouse without revealing to the server which
block is downloaded.
Our PBD protocol is built on the Paillier homomorphic en-
cryption scheme [35]. It is needed only when the encrypted data
warehouse is huge and it is hard for the client to download and
store the entire encrypted data warehouse.































































Before the client and the server run our PBD protocol, the
client may request the server to perform certain OLAP operations,
such as roll-up or drill-down, without revealing the real query of
the client. Suppose that the client wants to download a block B
from the encrypted data warehouse E(D). He randomly chooses
n − 1 blocks with the same dimensions as B and the n blocks
B1, B2, · · · , Bn (whereBi = B and 1 ≤ i ≤ n) form a cloaking
region CR.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each block Bi
contains m ciphertexts Ci1, Ci2, · · · , Cim in a order.
Algorithm 5 PBD Query Generation (Client)
Input: i, CR, n, PK (the public key of the server S)
Output: Q, sk
1: Randomly choose two large primes p, q on the basis of a
security parameter κ and PK , such that the size of N = pq
is more than the size of the ciphertext in E(D).
2: Let sk = {p, q} and pk = {g,N}, where g is chosen from
ZN2 and its order is a nonzero multiple of N .
3: For each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}





Encrypt(1, pk) = g1rNj (mod N
2) if j = i
Encrypt(0, pk) = g0rNj (mod N
2) otherwise
where the encryption algorithm is based on the Paillier cryp-
tosystem [35].
5: } //End of For
6: Let Q = {CR, n, z1, z2, · · · , zn, pk}, sk = {p, q}.
7: return Q, sk
Algorithm 6 PBD Response Generation RG (Server)
Input: Q = {CR, n, z1, z2, · · · , zn, pk = (g,N)}, PK
Output: R = {C1, C2, · · · , Cm}
1: Based on CR and n in Q, extract the n blocks
B1, B2, · · · , Bn with the same dimensions, where Bj =
{Cj1, Cj2, · · · , Cjm} (j = 1, 2, · · · , n)











3: Compute R = {C1, C2, · · · , Cm} =
∏n
j=1 Sj , where














where the modular arithmetic mod N2 is applied to each
component.
4: return R
Algorithm 7 PBD Response Retrieval RR (Client)
Input: R = {C1, C2, · · · , Cm}, sk = {p, q}
Output: B
1: Let λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1)







for i=1, 2, · · · ,m, the decryption algorithm is based on the
Paillier cryptosystem [35].
3: return B
To download the block Bi from the n blocks, the client C
runs our PBD protocol with the server S , composed of three
algorithms, Query Generation (QG), Response Generation (RG),
and Response Retrieval (RR), as described in Algorithms 5-7.
Note that p, q, g,N, sk, pk in Algorithms 5-7 are different
from those in Algorithms 1-4.
Theorem 2 (Correctness) Our PBD protocol is correct. In other
words, for any cloaking region CR, the number n of blocks,
the index i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and the public key PK , we
have Bi = RR(R, sk) holds, where (Q, sk) = QG(i, CR, n,
PK), R = RG(Q,PK), CR = {B1, B2, · · · , Bn} and
Bj = {Cj1, Cj2, · · · , Cjm} for j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Proof According to Algorithm 7, we have
RR(R, sk) = {Decrypt(C1, sk), · · · , Decrypt(Cm, sk)}.
To prove the theorem, we only need to prove that Ci1 =









C21 · · · (g1rNn )









Because a Paillier encryption of m is gmrN (mod N2), we can
see that C1 is an encryption of Ci1, i.e.,
Ci1 = Decrypt(C1, sk).
In the same way, we can prove that Cij = Decrypt(Cj , sk)
for j = 2, 3, · · · ,m and then Bi = RR(R, sk). Therefore, the
theorem is proved. △
In our PBD protocol, the server S can charge the client C
according to the size of CR and n. The cost for the client to
download the block is linear in the size of CR/n.
Our construction is similar to that of [9], [26]. The work of [26]
is based upon the cryptosystem of [19], which is homomorphic
over the group Z2, having ciphertext group ZN for a large
composite N . The approach by [9] is also based upon the Paillier
cryptosystem [35]. The difference is that our construction aims to
download a block while their construction aims to retrieve a single
data element only.
Like [9], the client may partition CR into n blocks according to
the dimensions of the data warehouse, such that n = n1n2 · · ·nd,
where ni is the total number of values of the ith dimension and
d is the total number of the dimensions of CR. For the dimension
with ni different values, the client runs Algorithm 1 to generate
a sub-query Qi = {zi1, zi2, · · · , zini , Ni}, where only the
ciphertext corresponding to the interested block is the encryption
of 1 and N2i < Ni+1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , d − 1. Then the client
sends a query Q = {CR, (n1, Q1), (n2, Q2), · · · , (nd, Qd)} to
the server, which runs Algorithm 2 for all sub-queries in series to
generate a response. In the end, the client decrypts the response
to obtain the block of interest from the encrypted data warehouse.
For details, please refer to [9].
4.3 Private OLAP Operations
Typical OLAP operations include roll-up (performing aggregation
by climbing up a concept hierarchy), drill-down (the reverse of































































roll-up), slice (performing a selection on one dimension, resulting
in a sub-cube), dice (performing a selection on two or more
dimensions, resulting in a sub-cube), and pivot (rotating the data
axes in view in order to provide an alternative presentation of the
data).
For private OLAP operations, we consider two cases as fol-
lows: Case 1 - the client C has not been provided the encrypted
data warehouse E(D); Case 2 - the client C has been provided the
encrypted data warehouse E(D) or has downloaded an encrypted
block Bi from the server S .
In Case 1, the client C may request the server S to perform
some OLAP operations which are not sensitive to the privacy
of queries. For example, roll-up from months to quarters along
the time dimension, drill-down from states to cities along to the
location dimension, and pivot the time and the location dimen-
sions. For slice and dice operations which are most sensitive to
the privacy of queries, the client C may run our PBD protocol to
download a slice or a dice of the encrypted data warehouse E(D)
from the server S .
In Case 2, when the client C has been provided E(D), it can
perform slice, dice or pivot operation on E(D) as he does on the
original data cube D because the dimension values in E(D) are
in plaintext. It is obvious that the sub-cube obtained by slice, dice
or pivot operation on the encrypted data cube E(D) takes a form
of encryption of the sub-cube obtained by the same operation on
the original data cube D.
For a roll-up operation on E(D), without loss of gener-
ality, we consider summarising a measure xi along the jth
dimension from a concept yj ∈ {a11, a12, ...} to a higher
concept Yj ∈ {A1, A2, · · · , Aρ}, where Ai = {ai1, ai2, · · · ,
aiℓ}. For example, roll-up from months ={Jan., Feb.,Mar.,
Apr.,May, Jun., Jul., Aug., Sep., Oct., Nov., Dec.} to
quarters ={Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4}, where Q1 = {Jan., Feb.,
Mar.}, Q2 = {Apr.,May, Jun}, Q3 = {Jul., Aug., Sep.}
and Q4 = {Oct.,Nov.,Dec.}.
Our roll-up operation on E(D) climbing the jth dimen-
sion from a concept {a11, a12, · · · } to a higher concept {A1,
A2, · · · , Aρ} can be described in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 Roll-Up (Client)
Input: E(D) = (E(x1), E(x2), · · · , E(xt))y1,··· ,yj ,··· ,yd , PK,
j, yj , {a11, a12, · · · }, Yj , {A1, A2, · · · , Aρ} where for
i = 1, 2, · · · , t, Ai = {ai1, ai2, · · · , aiℓ}
Output: E(D)∗ = (E(X1), E(X2), · · · , E(Xt))y1,··· ,Yj ,··· ,yd
1: For i = 1 to ρ
2: { Compute




(E(x1), E(x2), · · · , E(xt))y1,··· ,aik,··· ,yd
3: } //End of For
4: return (E(X1), E(X2), · · · , E(Xt))y1,··· ,Ai,··· ,yd (i =
1, 2, · · · , ρ)
Theorem 3 In Algorithm 4, given 1 ≤ i ≤ t, let XAk =
E(Xi)(y1,··· ,Ak,··· ,yn) and xaik = (xi)(y1,··· ,aik,··· ,yn), then
Decrypt(XAk , SK) =
∑ℓ
k=1 xaik .
Proof According to Algorithm 8, we have XAk =∏ℓ
k=1E(xaik). Due to the additionally homomorphic prop-
erty of the BGN and Paillier cryptosystems, we have
XAk = E(
∑ℓ
k=1 xaik). Therefore, we Decrypt(XAk , SK) =∑ℓ
k=1 xaik . The theorem is proved. △
Theorem 3 ensures that our roll-up operation on the encrypted
data cube is correct.
If the client runs our PCR protocol to decrypt the roll-up
results, he may randomly add some fake queries to hide the real
dimension of his interested data.
When the client C has downloaded an encrypted block (or sub-
cube) Bi of E(D), it can perform the roll-up operation on Bi in
the same way as described in Algorithm 8. We only need to change
E(D) to Bi.
At last, drill-down is reverse to roll-up. It can be implemented
by roll-up from the base of the encrypted data warehouse E(D)
to any footprint.
5 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
5.1 Privacy Analysis of PCR
In this section, we analyse the security of our Private Cell Retrieval
protocol (PCR) in terms of the server’s privacy and the client’s
privacy defined in Section 3.3.
The Paillier cryptosystem provides semantic security against
chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The ability to successfully
distinguish the challenge ciphertext essentially amounts to the
ability to decide composite residuosity. The decisional composite
residuosity (DCR) problem can be described as: given a composite
integerN and an integer y, decide whether y isN -residue modulo
N2 or not, i.e., whether there exists an integer x such that
y = xN (mod N2).
When N = pq where p, q are distinct large primes, Paillier
[35] has shown that the DCR problem is as hard as the integer
factorisation problem. Therefore, the DCR problem is believed to
be intractable.
Since the definition for the server’s privacy is the same as the
semantic security of the Paillier scheme and thus we have
Theorem 4 Under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR)
assumption (i.e., the DCR problem is hard), the server in our
Paillier-based PCR protocol has (semantic) data privacy.
Based on the definition of client’s privacy, we consider the
following game:
(1) Given the public/private key pair (PK,SK) of the Pail-
lier cryptosystem, the adversary A chooses two different
ciphertexts C1 and C2, and then sends them to the
challenger C.
(2) The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1},
and executes the Query Generation (QG) to obtain
(Qb, sb) = QG(Cb, PK). According to Algorithm 6,
we have Qb = C
sb
b (mod N
2), where sb is randomly
chosen from {1, 2, · · · , N} and known to the challenger
C. Then Qb is sent back to A.
(3) The adversary A can experiment with the code of Qb
in an arbitrary non-black-box way, and finally outputs
b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Due to the randomness of sb chosen by the client in Step 2 of
the game, we have
Theorem 5 In our Paillier-based PCR protocol, the client has
(semantic) query privacy.































































5.2 Privacy Analysis of PBD
In this section, we analyse the security of our Private Block
Download protocol (PBD). Because our PBD protocol operates
on the encrypted data only and does not involve any decryption
by the server, it is obvious that our PBD protocol has server’s
privacy. Thus we only need to analyse client’s privacy for our
PBD protocol.
Based on the definition of client’s privacy in Section 3.3, after
the challenger C specifies a cloaking region CR in the encrypted
data warehouse E(D) and the total number n of blocks in CR
and provides the adversary A with CR and n, we consider the
following game:
(1) The adversary A selects n blocks with the same di-
mensions from E(D) according to CR and chooses two
different blocks B0 and B1 of the n blocks and then
sends B0, B1 to the challenger C.
(2) The challenger C chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1},
and executes the Query Generation (QG) to ob-
tain (Qb, sk) = QG(b, CR, n, PK), where Qb =
{CR, n, z1, z2, · · · , zn, (g,N)} and sk = {p, q} as
described in Algorithm 5. Then C sends Qb back to A.
(3) The adversary A can experiment with the code of Qb
in an arbitrary non-black-box way, and finally outputs
b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
In Step 2, z1, z2, · · · , zn are encryptions of either 0 or 1
by the Paillier cryptosystem with the public key pk = (g,N)
generated by C. If the adversary A can win the game with non-
negligible advantage, we can use the adversary A to break the
Paillier cryptosystem.
Theorem 6 Under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR)
assumption (i.e., the DCR problem is hard), the client in our
Private Block Download (PBR) protocol has (semantic) query
privacy.
Proof Assume that the adversary A can win the game with non-
negligible advantage ǫ. Now we use the adversary A to break the
Paillier cryptosystem.
Suppose that we are given the public key pk = (g,N) of the
Paillier cryptosystem, we challenge two plaintexts 0 and 1 and
we are randomly given the encryption of either 0 or 1, denoted
as β. Given CR and n, we construct the query Qb by letting
zi = β and zj = Encrypt(0, pk) for j 6= i. When β is
the encryption of 1, Qb stands for a real query. In this case,
the probability of the adversary A in guessing b correctly is
1/2 + ǫ, where ǫ is non-negligible. When β is the encryption
of 0, Qb contains encryptions of 0s only and is independent of
b. In this case, the adversary A can only guess randomly and
the probability of the adversary A in guessing b correctly is 1/2.
When the adversary A guesses b correctly, we conclude that β is
the encryption of 1 and 0 otherwise. In this way, our probability
to break the semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem is
1/2 · 1/2 + 1/2 · (1/2 + ǫ) = 1/2 + ǫ/2. In other words, we
break the semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem with a
non-negligible advantage.
However, under the decisional composite residuosity
(DCR) assumption, the Paillier cryptosystem has semantic security
against IND-CPA. Therefore, there does not exist an adversary A
who can win the game with non-negligible advantage and PBD
protocol has the (semantic) query privacy. △
5.3 Privacy Analysis of Multiple Queries with PBD/PCR
In this section, we analyse the client’s privacy when both PBD and
PCR are run in succession.
Based on the definition of client’s privacy for multiple queries
in Section 3.3, we consider the following game between an
adversary (the server) A and a challenger C as follows.
(1) Give an encrypted data cube E(D) and the pub-
lic/private key pair (PK,SK) of the server, the ad-
versary A chooses two different sequences of cipher-
texts or blocks of ciphertexts, A0,1, A0,2, · · · , A0,ℓ and
A1,1, A1,2, · · · , A1,ℓ, whereAi,j is either a ciphertext or
a block of ciphertexts. When Ai,j is a block of cipher-
texts, A0,j and A1,j are two of nj blocks of ciphertexts
with the same dimensions. Then A sends them to the
challenger C.
(2) The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1},
and executes the Query Generation (QG) on Ab,j to
obtain (Qb,j , sb,j) = QG(Ab,j , PK) (in the case of
PCR) or (Qb,j , skb,j) = QG(b, CRj , nj , PK) (in the
case of PBD), where j = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ and sb,j and
skb,j are the secrets of the challenger C. and then sends
Qb,1, Qb,2, · · · , Qb,ℓ back to the adversary A.
In the case of the BGN-based PCR protocol, Qb,j =
e(Ab,j , g)e(g, g)
sb,je(g, h)rb,j if Cb,j ∈ G or Qb,j =
Cb,je(g, g)
sb,je(g, h)rb,j if Cb,j ∈ G1, where sb,j , rb,j
are randomly chosen from {1, 2, · · · , N} and known to
the challenger C.
In the case of the Paillier-based PCR, Qb,j = C
sb,j
b,j
where sb,j is randomly chosen from {1, 2, · · · , N} and
known to the challenger C.
In the case of PBD, Qb,j =
{CRj , nj , zb,1,j , · · · , zb,n,j , (g,N)} where
zb,k,j = Encrypt(1, pk) = g
1rNb,k,j if k is the
index of the block Ab,j or zb,k,j = Encrypt(0, pk)
= g0rNb,k,j(mod N
2) if k is not the index of the block
Ab,j , and rb,k,j is randomly chosen for Z
∗
N2 . We assume
that skb,j = {p, q} for all b and j.
(3) The adversary A can experiment with the code of Qb,1,
Qb,2, · · · , Qb,ℓ in an arbitrary non-black-box way, and
finally outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
In Step 3, all queries Qb,1, Qb,2, · · · , Qb,ℓ look independent
to the adversary A because sb,j , rb,j (in the case of PCR) and
rb,k,j (in the case of PBD) are randomly chosen by the challenger
C.
Theorem 7 Under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) as-
sumption (i.e., the DCR problem is hard), the client has (semantic)
query privacy for multiple queries based on Definition 3.
Proof Assume that the adversary A can win the above game with
a probability p and the multiple queries are composed of ℓ1 PCR
queries and ℓ2 PBD queries. Since all queries look independent to
the adversary, the adversary wins the game in two cases - winning
the game by querying ℓ1 PCR or winning the game by querying
ℓ2 PBD. Assume that the probability of the adversary winning the
game by querying a single PCR is p1 and the probability of the
adversary winning the game by querying a single PBD is p2, then
p ≤ p1ℓ1/ℓ + p2ℓ2/ℓ, i.e., p− 1/2 ≤ (p1 − 1/2)ℓ1/ℓ + (p2 −
1/2)ℓ1/ℓ. If the adversary A can win the above game with a non-
negligible advantage ǫ = p−1/2, then either p1−1/2 or p2−1/2
is non-negligible, which is in contradiction with either Theorem































































5 or 6. Therefore, the advantage of the adversary in winning the
above game is negligible and the theorem is proved. △
6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
6.1 Performance Analysis of Paillier-Based PCR
Our Private Cell Retrieval (PCR) protocol is composed of Query
Generation, Response Generation and Response Retrieval. Before
the client and the server can run the PCR protocol, the server
needs to encrypt the entire data warehouse D in Algorithm 1
and distribute it to the client. This initialisation costs O(|D|)
computation complexity and O(|D|) communication complexity
in the server, andO(|D|) communication complexity in the client.
This initialisation happens only once. Then the client and the
server can run our PCR protocol repeatedly.
In the query generation (Algorithm 2), the client generates a
query (Q, s) with one exponentiation Cs(mod N2) and sends the
result to the server.
In the response generation (Algorithm 3), the server receivesQ
and generates a response R with one modular exponentiation and
then returns the result to the client. Note that gλ in the decryption
can be pre-computed.
In the response retrieval (Algorithm 4), after receiving R, the
client retrieves m with modular multiplications only.
6.2 Performance Analysis of PBD
To make our PCR protocol feasible, our PBD protocol allows the
client to download a part of the encrypted data warehouse without
revealing to the server which part is downloaded.
In the query generation (Algorithm 5) of our PBD protocol,
the client needs to generate a public and private key pair for
the Paillier cryptosystem once. The public and private keys can
be used repeatedly. Therefore, the public and private key pair
can be pre-generated. In addition, the client needs to compute n
ciphertexts z1, z2, · · · , zn under the Paillier cryptosystem for the
query Q, where n is the number of blocks in the cloaking region
CR. With reference to Algorithm 5, the client needs to compute
O(n) modular exponentiations.
In the response generation (Algorithm 6), the server needs
to compute O(nm) modular exponentiations, where m is the
number of the ciphertexts in each block . Note the computation
of modular multiplications can be omitted in comparison to the
computation of modular exponentiations.
In the response retrieval (Algorithm 7), the client needs to
decrypt m ciphertexts C1, C2, · · · , Cm under the Paillier cryp-
tosystem, which amounts to O(m) modular exponentiations.
In addition, the client sends O(n) ciphertexts to the server
while the server sends back O(m) ciphertexts to the client.
Therefore, the total communication complexity is O(n) +O(m),
which is much less than O(nm) ciphertexts (the size of the
cloaking region).
Our PBD protocol is particularly efficient in communication.
It needs only (O(n) + O(m))/O(nm) ≈ 1/n communica-
tion of the entire CR download. In the case where n = 100,
m = 100, 000 and the ciphertext size is 2,402 bits, our PBD
protocol needs 240.44M bits of communications, while the entire
CR download needs 24.02G bits of communications. In addition,
the client’s computation complexity O(n) + O(m) is much less
than the server’s computation complexity O(nm). In practice,
the server has more powerful computation capability than the
client. Our PBD protocol reflects this feature. To improve the
computational efficiency, the server may run our PBD protocol
in parallel on multiple computers because our PBD protocol can
support parallel computing. In the case where there are ℓ comput-
ers running in parallel in the server, the computation complexity
of each computer in the server is O(nm/ℓ) only.
6.3 Performance Analysis of Private OLAP
With our PBD protocol, the client can perform private slice and
dice in the server side. The computation and communication
complexities for our PBD protocol are analyzed in the last section.
The computational complexity for the client to perform slice,
dice or pivot operation on the local encrypted data cube is the same
as that of the operation on the original data cube. The computa-
tional complexity of the roll-up operation on the local encrypted
data cube in Algorithm 8 is O(|E(D)|) group multiplications,
where |E(D)| is the number of ciphertexts in E(D). The drill-
down operation can be implemented with the roll-up operation
and thus its performance depends on the performance of the roll-
up operation.
6.4 Comparison
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) requires that the communi-
cation complexity is less than the size of the database. We can
achieve this by combining our PBD and PCR protocols, i.e., the
client runs our PBD protocol to download a block of the encrypted
data warehouse from the server at first and then runs our PCR
protocol with the server to decrypt a cell of the block.
Assume that the cloaking region CR is the entire data ware-
house and has n = n1n2 · · ·nd blocks according to d dimen-
sions of the data warehouse, the performance comparison of our
PBD+PCR protocols with existing single database PIR protocols,
such as [8], [9], [15], [25], [31], [32] is shown in Table 1. In
Table 1, m in our protocol is the number of ciphertexts in a
block. In other protocols, m is 1. From Table 1, we can see that
the performance of our PBD + PCR protocols are comparable to
the performance of other PIR protocols. In particular, our PBD
+ PCR protocols offers both the server’s privacy and the client’s
privacy, while other PIR protocols have the client’s privacy only.
In addition, the existing PIR solutions cannot keep the privacy of
OLAP operations for the client.
In Table 1, we also compare the performance of our PCR
protocols with existing single database SPIR protocols (also
known as oblivious transfer (OT) protocols), such as Naor-Pinkas
protocols [31], [32]. In these protocols, the server encrypts the data
(x1, x2, · · · , xn) using keys (k1, k2, · · · , kn) to get ciphertexts
(C1, C2, · · · , Cn), and sends the ciphertexts to the client. The
client and server then engage in a OT protocol, where the client
learns a key. The client uses this key to decrypt the data.
Our PCR protocols can supports homomorphic additions or
one homomorphic multiplication over the encrypted data. But NP
protocols [31], [32] do not have the homomorphic property for
their encrypted data.
When the client has no constraint in communication and
storage, he can download from the server the whole cloaking
region CR with n encrypted blocks, one of which is what the
client wants to use. Whenever the client wishes to retrieve a cell
from the block, he runs the Paillier-based PCR with the server.
This is the most efficient solution and privacy of this solution is
the same as our PBD and Paillier-based PCR protocols.
























































































































































































































































Summary of Changes from Conference Version 
 
A preliminary version of this paper has been published in 18th ACM Symposium on Access 
Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT), Amsterdam, The Nethertands, June 12-14, 2013. 
The conference version is attached to this submission. The additional content compared to the 
conference version includes: 
1) A new model for private block download (PBD) in Section 3.2.  
2) Security definitions for PBD in Section 3.3.  
3) Client’s privacy definition for multiple queries in Section 3.3. 
4) A new private cell retrieval (PCR) protocol based on the Paillier cryptosystem 
(Algorithms 1-4) in Section 4.1. 
5) A new PBD protocol (Algorithms 5-7) in Section 4.2. 
6) Privacy analysis on our Paillier-based PCR protocol in Section 5.1.  
7) Privacy analysis on our PBD protocol in Section 5.2.  
8) Privacy analysis on multiple queries with PBD/PCR in Section 5.3. 
9) Performance analysis on our Paillier-based PCR protocol in Section 6.1.  
10) Performance analysis on our PBD protocol in Section 6.2.  
11) Performance comparison in Section 6.4.  
12) Experiment evaluation on our solutions in Section 7. 
 
 






























































Private Data Warehouse Queries
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Publicly accessible data warehouses are an indispensable resource
for data analysis. But they also pose a significant risk to the pri-
vacy of the clients, since a data warehouse operator may follow the
client’s queries and infer what the client is interested in. Private In-
formation Retrieval (PIR) techniques allow the client to retrieve a
cell from a data warehouse without revealing to the operator which
cell is retrieved. However, PIR cannot be used to hide OLAP op-
erations performed by the client, which may disclose the client’s
interest. This paper presents a solution for private data warehouse
queries on the basis of the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem which
allows one to evaluate any multi-variate polynomial of total degree
2 on ciphertexts. By our solution, the client can perform OLAP
operations on the data warehouse and retrieve one (or more) cell
without revealing any information about which cell is selected. Fur-
thermore, our solution supports some types of statistical analysis
on data warehouse, such as regression and variance analysis, with-
out revealing the client’s interest. Our solution ensures both the
server’s security and the client’s security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2 [Database Management]: Security, integrity, and protection;




Data warehouse, OLAP, privacy, homomorphic encryption
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1. INTRODUCTION
Data warehousing provides tools for business executives to sys-
tematically organise, understand, and use their data to make strate-
gic decisions. A large number of organizations have found that
data warehouses are valuable in today’s competitive, fast-evolving
world. In the last several years, many firms have spent millions of
dollars in building enterprise-wide data warehouse. Many people
feel that with competition mounting in every industry, data ware-
house is the latest must-have marketing weapon - a way to keep
customers by learning more about their needs [16].
A data warehouse is a subject - oriented, integrated, time -
variant and non - volatile collection of data in support of manage-
ment’s decision making process [17]. Data warehouses are built
on a multidimensional data model. This model views data in the
form of a data cube. A data cube, defined by dimensions and mea-
sures, allows data to be viewed in multiple dimensions. In general,
dimensions are the entities with respect to which we want to keep
records. For example, a sales data warehouse may keep records
of the store’s sales with respect to dimensions - time, location and
product. Measures are the quantities by which we want to anal-
yse relationships between dimensions. Examples of measures for a
sales data warehouse include the sales amount, the number of units
sold, and the average sales amount.
In the multidimensional model, data is organised into multiple
dimensions, where each dimension has multiple-levels of abstrac-
tion defined by a concept hierarchy. A concept hierarchy defines
a sequence of mapping from a set of low-level concepts to high-
level, more general concepts. The concept hierarchy for locations
could be street, city, state, and country. This organisation provides
clients with the flexibility to view data from different perspectives.
A number of online analytical processing (OLAP) operations exist
to materialise these different views, supporting interactive querying
and analysis of the data at hand. Typical OLAP operations include:
roll-up (aggregation by climbing up a concept hierarchy); drill-
down (the reverse of roll-up); slice (a selection on one dimension,
resulting in a sub-cube); dice (a selection on two or more dimen-
sions, resulting in a sub-cube); pivot (rotating the data axes in view
in order to provide an alternative presentation of the data).
Queries to the data warehouse are based on a star-net model,
which consists of radial lines emanating from a central point, where
each line represents a concept hierarchy of a dimension. These






























































represent the granularities available for use by OLAP operations
such as drill-down and roll-up.
In order to query the data warehouse, a user usually first requests
the server to perform OLAP operations and then sends back a cell.
An important issue in this simple process is represented by the pri-
vacy of the user query as a user query may reveal to the server
business sensitive information about the user. For example, for a
stock exchange data warehouse, the user may be an investor, who
queries the data warehouse for the trend of a certain stock. He may
wish to keep private the identity of the stock he is interested in.
For a pharmaceutical data warehouse, the user may be a laboratory,
which would like to keep private the active principles it wants to
use. To protect his privacy, the user accessing a data warehouse
may therefore want to perform OLAP operations and retrieve a cell
without revealing any information about which cell he is interested
in.
A trivial solution to the above private data warehouse query prob-
lem is for the user to download the entire data warehouse and then
locally perform OLAP operations and retrieve the cell of interest.
This solution is not suitable if the owner of the data warehouse
wishes to make profit through data warehouse services (for exam-
ple, a health care data warehouse). Usually, the user is interested
in only a part of the data warehouse. Purchasing the entire data
warehouse may not be an economic way to the user.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols, such as [8], do not
fully address the private data warehouse query problem. A PIR pro-
tocol allows a user to retrieve a record from a database without the
owner of that database being able to determine which record was
selected with communication cost less than the database size. By
using PIR, a user can retrieve a cell (a record) from a data ware-
house (a database) without revealing any information about which
cell is retrieved. However, the user cannot hide his OLAP opera-
tions to the server when he requests the server to perform the opera-
tions. These operations may reveal the user’s interest. For example,
when the user requests the server to perform a slice operation with
respect to a location, the server can learn the user’s interest in the
location. It is a challenge to assure the user’s privacy when per-
forming OLAP operations.
In this paper, we give a solution for private data warehouse queries
on the basis of the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [4]. Our basic
idea is to allow the data warehouse owner to encrypt its data ware-
house and distribute the encrypted data warehouse to the user who
wishes to perform private data warehouse queries. The user can
perform any OLAP operations on the encrypted data warehouse
locally without revealing his interest. When the user wishes to de-
crypt a cell of the encrypted data warehouse, the user and the server
run a Private Cell Retrieval (PCR) protocol jointly to decrypt the
cell without revealing to the server which cell is retrieved. Assume
that the serve charges the client per query, our solution allows the
user to perform some statistical analysis, such as regression and
variance analysis, on the encrypted data warehouse with the lowest
cost.
Unlike operational databases, data warehouse is non-volatile. The
data in the data warehouse is never over-written or deleted - once
committed; the data is static, read-only, and retained for future re-
porting. It is feasible to allow the data warehouse owner to dis-
tribute the encrypted data warehouse to potential users only once
and later let the users download new added data online if any.
Our solution ensures both the server’s security in the sense that
the server, for billing purpose, releases to the user only a data per
query, and the client’s security in the sense that the client does not
reveal any information about his queries to the server. We have
implemented our solution on an example of data warehouse and
experiments have shown that our solution is practical for private
data warehouse queries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is
surveyed in Section 2. We define our model and described our
solution in Section 3. The security and performance analysis is
carried out in Section 4. Experiment results are shown in Section
5. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
2. RELATEDWORK
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) was firstly introduced by Chor,
Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan in 1995 [8]. In their paper, they
proposed a set of schemes to implement PIR through replicated
databases, which provide users with information-theoretic security
as long as some of the database relicas do not collude against the
user. Since then, a lot of research on PIR has been done. We clas-
sify the results as follows [2, 29].
• Theoretical Private Information Retrieval
“Theoretical” stands for the fact, that the user privacy is as-
sumed to be unbreakable independently from the compu-
tational power of a cheater. Chor et al. proved, that any
theoretical PIR solution has a communication with a lower
bound equal to the database size [8]. Thus they relax the
problem setting. They assume that there are several (instead
of one) database servers, which do not communicate among
each other, with the same data. This assumption makes the
non-trivial theoretical PIR feasible. The basic idea is to send
several queries to several databases. The queries are con-
structed in such a way, that they give no information to the
servers about the record that user is interested in. But using
the answers from the queries, the user can construct the de-
sired record. There is also a case considered, when up to t of
the servers are allowed to cooperate against the user.
Ambainis [1] improved the results of Chor et al. [8], which
led to the following non-trivial theoretical PIR solutions: (1)
A k database scheme (i.e., a scheme with k identical databases
non-communicating to each other), for any constant k ≥
2, with communication complexity O(N1/(2k−1)); (2) A
Θ(logN) database scheme with communication complexity
O(log2N · loglogN), where N is the size of the database.
Further research on theoretical PIR appears in [18, 19, 20,
3].
• Computational Private Information Retrieval
In order to get better communication complexity, another as-
sumption was weakened by Chor and Gilboa [7]. “Compu-
tational” means that the database servers are presumed to
be computationally bounded, i.e., under an appropriate in-
tractability assumption, the database cannot gain information
about which data element was selected by the user. For every
ǫ > 0, Chor and Gilboa [7] presented two computational PIR
schemes with complexity O(N ǫ).
In the first paper on PIR [8] it was proven, that the theoretical
PIR problem has no non-trivial solutions for the case of sin-
gle database. Surprisingly, the substitution of an information-
theoretic security with an intractability assumption achieves
a non-trivial PIR protocol for single database schema [22].
Its communication complexity isO(N ǫ) for any ǫ > 0. They
use an intractability assumption, described in [15]. The basic
approach is to encrypt a query in such a way, that the server
still can process it using special algorithms. However, the
server recognizes neither the clear-text query nor the result.






























































The result can be decrypted only by the user. This was the
first single-database protocol, where designer considers and
provides database privacy. Using another intractability as-
sumption, Cachin et al. [5] demonstrated a single database
computational PIR protocol that has poly-logarithmic com-
munication. This is an improvement in comparing to poly-
nomial communication complexity in [22]. This result looks
particular effective, because the user has to send a minimum
logN bits just to address the bit he wants to retrieve in the
database. A scheme with better result appears in [6, 23, 24,
12].
• Symmetrical Private Information Retrieval
Symmetrical PIR is a PIR problem, where the privacy of
the database is considered, i.e., a symmetrical PIR protocol
must prevent the user from learning more than one record of
the database during a session. Clearly, symmetrical privacy
(database privacy) is a very important property for practical
applications, since an efficient billing is only then possible.
A symmetrical PIR protocol for single server was first pro-
posed in [21], and for several servers it was considered in
[14]. Other symmetrical PIR were later proposed in [27, 26].
In addition, Private Block Retrieval (PBR) is a natural extension
of PIR in which, instead of retrieving only a single bit, the user
retrieves a d-bit block that begins at an index i. PBR techniques are
important for making PIR practical. Theoretic PBR was introduced
in [8]. A practical PBR scheme for a single database was given by
Gentry and Ramzan [12]. The security of this scheme is based on
a simple variant of the Φ-hiding number-theoretic assumption by
Cachin, Micali and Stadler [5]. This scheme has communication
complexityO(k+d) only, where k ≥ logN is a security parameter
that depends on the database size N and d is the bit-length of the
retrieved database block.
Current PIR or PBR protocols can be only used for Private Cell
Retrieval (PCR) in private data warehouse queries. They are unabl
to support private OLAP operations.
3. PRIVATEDATAWAREHOUSEQUERIES
3.1 Our Model
We consider a data cubeD with n dimensions y1, y2, · · · yn and
m measures x1, x2, · · · , xm, denoted as
D = (x1, x2, · · · , xm)y1,y2,··· ,yn .
We assume that the data cube is provided by a server S and used
by clients. The server S wishes to make a profit by providing
data warehouse services to clients. The clients wish to learn some
knowledge fromD through OLAP operations onD without reveal-
ing their interests to S.
First of all, on input a security parameter k, the server S gener-
ates its public/private key pair {PK,SK}, encrypts the data cube
D into E(D) with the public key PK, where the values of all
measure attributes are encrypted, but the values of all dimension
attributes are in plaintexts. The encrypted data cube E(D) can be
then released to clients.
A client C can either download the encrypted data cube E(D)
from the server’s Web site or request the server to send a CD of
the encrypted data cube by post. It happens only once because the
data warehouse is non-volatile. For new data added into the data
cube, we allow the users to download it online. The client can then
perform any OLAP operation on the encrypted data cube E(D)
locally.
Remark In many cases, the “client” is actually an organization that
then has no problem in downloading and storing the encrypted data
warehouse E(D) and performing OLAP operations on E(D).
In order to retrieve a cell from the data cube D after several
OLAP operations on E(D) (i.e., to decrypt a ciphertext C from
the encrypted data cube E(D) after several OLAP operations on
E(D)), the server S and the client C runs a Private Cell Retrieval
(PCR) protocol, composed of three algorithms as follows.
(1) Query Generation (QG): Takes as input the public key PK
of the server S, the ciphertext C, which is an encryption of
either a measure value or a function of several measure val-
ues, (the client) outputs a query Q and a secret s, denoted as
(Q, s) = QG(C,PK).
(2) Response Generation (RG): Takes as input the query Q and
the private key SK of the server S, (the server) outputs a
response R, denoted as R = RG(Q,SK).
(3) Response Retrieval (RR): Takes as input the public key PK
of the server S, the response R and the secret s of the client,
(the client) outputs a plaintext x, denoted as x = RR(R,PK,
s).
A PCR protocol can be illustrated as in Fig. 1 and is correct if, for
any security parameter k, for any ciphertextC,Decrypt(C, SK) =




1. (Q,s) = QG(C,PK) 
Q 
2. R= RG(Q,SK) 
R 
3. m = RR(R,PK,s) 
Figure 1: Private Cell Retrieval
The security of the PCR protocol involves the server’s security
and the client’s security. Intuitively, the serve S wishes to release
only one measure value to the client C each time when the client
sends a query. Meanwhile, the client C does not wish to reveal to
the server which cell is retrieved.
Formally, the server’s security can be can be defined with a game
as follows.
Given a data cube D and the public key PK of the server, con-
sider the following game between an adversary (the client) A, and
a challenger C. The game consists of the following steps:
(1) Given the public key PK of the server, the adversary A
chooses two different valuesm1,m2 of twomeasure attributes
and sends them to C.
(2) The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and en-
crypts mb to obtain Cb = Encrypt(mb, PK), and then
sends Cb back to A.






























































(3) The adversary A can experiment with the code of Cb in an
arbitrary non-black-box way, and finally outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if b′ = b and loses otherwise. We
define the adversary A’s advantage in this game to be
AdvA(k) = |Pr(b′ = b)− 1/2|.
Definition 1 (Server’s Security Definition). In a PCR protocol,
the data warehouse server has semantic security if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaryA, we have that AdvA(k)
is a negligible function, where the probability is taken over coin-
tosses of the challenger and the adversary.
Remark. Server’s security ensures that the client cannot decrypt
any ciphertext in the encrypted data cubeE(D) without the help of
the server.
Next, we formally define the client’s security with a game as
follows.
Give an encrypted data cube E(D) and the public/private key
pair (PK,SK) of the server, consider the following game between
an adversary (the server)A, and a challenger C. The game consists
of the following steps:
(1) Given the public/private key pair (PK,SK) of the server,
the adversary A chooses two different ciphertexts C1 and
C2, and then sends them to the challenger C.
(2) The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and
executes the Query Generation (QG) to obtain (Qb, sb) =
QG(Cb, PK), where sb is the secret of the challenger C, and
then sends Qb back to A.
(3) The adversary A can experiment with the code of Qb in an
arbitrary non-black-box way, and finally outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if b′ = b and loses otherwise. W
define the adversary A’s advantage in this game to be
AdvA(k) = |Pr(b′ = b)− 1/2|.
Definition 2 (Client’s Security Definition). In a PCR protocol, the
client has semantic security if for any probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversaryA, we have that AdvA(k) is a negligible function,
where the probability is taken over coin-tosses of the challenger
and the adversary.
Remark. Client’s security ensures that the server cannot tell what
information the client has retrieved from the data cube E(D).
3.2 Private Cell Retrieval
Based on our model, we give a construction of a PCR protocol
which allows the client to retrieve a measure value in a cell without
revealing the measure and cell attributes to the server.
Our protocol is built on the BGN homomorphic encryption scheme
[4] (please refer to Appendix). The data server S generates and
publishes its public key PK = {N,G,G1, e, g, h1, e(g, g)q1},
and keeps its private key SK = {q1} secret.
Remark: Slightly different from the BGN scheme, we replace h
with h1 in the public key (please refer to Appendix) and include
e(g, g)q1 as a public parameter. It does not affect the security of
the BGN scheme because the discrete logarithm problem of deter-
mining the private key q1 from e(g, g)
q1 is hard, where q1 is large
prime. We publish e(g, g)q1 so that the client C can obtain the de-
cryption privately (please refer to Algorithm 4).
Before releasing the data cube to clients, the data warehouse
server S runs the Initialisation algorithm to encrypt the data cube
D to E(D), as described in Algorithm 1.
After obtaining the encrypted data cubeE(D), if a client C wishes
to retrieve a measure value in a cell, in other words, to decrypt a ci-
phertext C in a cell, the client C and the server S run our Private
Cell Retrieval protocol, composed of three algorithms, Query Gen-
eration (QG), Response Generation (RG), and Response Retrieval
(RR), as described in Algorithms 2-4.
Algorithm 1 Initialisation (Server)
Input: D = (x1, x2, · · · , xm)y1,y2,··· ,yn , PK
Output: E(D) = (E(x1), E(x2), · · · , E(xm))y1,y2,··· ,yn
1: Let E(D) = D
2: For each measure value x = (xi)y1,y2,··· ,ym , where 1 ≤ i ≤
m and (y1, y2, · · · , ym) ∈ DD (dimension domain) .
3: Pick a random integer r from {1, 2, · · · , N}
4: Compute z = Encrypt(x, PK) = gxhr and replace
(xi)y1,y2,··· ,yn with z, denoted as (E(xi))y1,y2,··· ,yn .
5: return E(D)
Algorithm 2 Query Generation QG (Client)
Input: C,PK
Output: Q, s
1: Pick two random integers s, r from {1, 2, · · · , N}
2: If C ∈ G, compute Q = e(C, g)e(g, g)shr1
3: If C ∈ G1, compute Q = Ce(g, g)shr1
4: return (Q, s)
Algorithm 3 Response Generation RG (Server)
Input: Q ∈ G1, SK = q1
Output: R
1: Compute R = QSK
2: return R
Algorithm 4 Response Retrieval RR (Client)
Input: R,PK, s
Output: m
1: Compute R′ = R/(e(g, g)q1)s
2: Compute m = loge(g,g)q1 R
′ with Porland’s lambda method
[25].
3: return m
Theorem 1 (Correctness) Our PCR protocol is correct. In other
words, for any security parameter k, for any ciphertext C,
Decrypt(C, SK) = RR(R,PK, s)
holds, where (Q, s) = QG(C,PK) and R = RG(Q,SK).





. With reference to Appendix, we haveDecrypt(C, SK) =































































R = RG(Q,SK) = QSK















In case of the ciphertextC ∈ G1, we assume thatC = e(g, g)m′hr′1 .
With reference to Appendix, we have Decrypt(C, SK) = m′. In
addition,












Therefore, R′ = R/e(g, g)q1s = (e(g, g)q1)m
′
and we have
m = loge(g,g)q1 R
′ = m′, i.e.,Decrypt(C, SK) = RR(R,PK, s).
The theorem is proved. △
3.3 Private OLAP Operations
Typical OLAP operations include roll-up (performing aggrega-
tion by climbing up a concept hierarchy), drill-down (the reverse of
roll-up), slice (performing a selection on one dimension, resulting
in a sub-cube), dice (performing a selection on two or more dimen-
sions, resulting in a sub-cube), and pivot (rotating the data axes in
view in order to provide an alternative presentation of the data).
After obtaining the encrypted data cube E(D), a client C can
perform drill-down, slice, dice or pivot operation on E(D) as he
does on the original data cube D because the dimension values in
E(D) are in plain. It is obvious that the sub-cube obtained by slice,
dice or pivot operation on the encrypted data cube E(D) takes a
form of encryption of the sub-cube obtained by the same operation
on the original data cubeD.
For a roll-up operation on E(D), without loss of generality, we
consider summarising a measure xi along the j-th dimension from
a concept yj ∈ {a1, a2, ...} to a higher concept Yj ∈ {A1, A2, ...},
where for any as, there is At such that as ∈ At. Our roll-up
operation on E(D) is described in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Roll-Up (Client)
Input: E(D) = (E(x1), E(x2), · · · , E(xm))y1,··· ,yj ,··· ,yn , PK,
{A1, A2, ...}
Output: E(D)∗ = (E(x1), E(x2), · · · , E(xm))y1,··· ,Yj ,··· ,yn
1: Let E(D)∗ = (E(0), E(0), · · · , E(0))y1,··· ,Yj ,··· ,yn
2: For each encrypted measure value x = (E(xi))y1,··· ,yj ,··· ,ym
in E(D), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and yj ∈ {a1, a2, · · · }
3: If yj = as ∈ At and X = (E(xi))y1,··· ,Yj ,··· ,yn in E(D)∗
where Yj = At, let Z = xX and replaceX with Z in the cell
(y1, · · · , Yj , · · · , yn) of E(D)∗.
4: return E(D)∗
Theorem 2 In Algorithm 5, given 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let
XAt = E(xi)(y1,··· ,Yj ,··· ,yn)
where Yj = At and xas = (xi)(y1,··· ,yj ,··· ,yn) where yj = as,




















The theorem is proved. △
Theorem 2 ensures that our roll-up operation on the encrypted
data cube is correct.
3.4 Private Statistical Analysis
Our data cube is encrypted by the BGN cryptosystem. As shown
in Appendix, the BGN cryptosystem has an additive homomor-
phism. In addition, the bilinear map allows for one multiplication
on encrypted values. As a result, the BGN cryptosystem supports
arbitrary additions and one multiplication (followed by arbitrary
additions) on encrypted data. This property in turn allows the eval-
uation of multi-variate polynomials of total degree 2 on encrypted
values.
In view of this, we are able to perform those statistical analy-
ses on the data cube in private, which involves the evaluation of
multi-variate polynomials of total degree 2 on encrypted values,
e.g., regression and variance analysis.
Remark. Most practical homomorphic cryptosystems, such as RSA
[32], ElGamal [11], Goldwasser-Micali [15], Damgard-Jurik [9]
and Paillier [30] schemes, provide only one homomorphism, either
addition, multiplication, or XOR. They cannot be used to evaluate
multi-variate polynomials of total degree 2 on encrypted values.
Some statistical analysis requires to compute multi-variate poly-
nomials of total degree 2. Although fully homomorphic encryp-
tion techniques [13, 33, 10] can be used to evaluate multi-variate
polynomials of any degree, the state-of-the-art is still impractical in
applications because the ciphertext size and computation time in-
crease sharply as one increases the security level. So far, the BGN
cryptosystem [4] is the only practical encryption scheme which can
evaluate multi-variate polynomials of total degree 2 on encrypted
values.This is why we choose the BGN cryptosystem as our under-
lying encryption scheme.
Let f(x1, x2, · · · , xℓ) be a ℓ-variate polynomial of total degree
2. For a purpose of statistical analysis, a user wishes to com-
pute f(a1, a2, · · · , aℓ) in private, where a1, a2, · · · , aℓ are mea-
sure values in the data cube D. Given the encrypted data cube
E(D), the user obtains the encryptions of a1, a2, · · · , aℓ, denoted
as E(a1), E(a2), · · · , E(aℓ) and runs Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Private Evaluation (Client, Server)
Input: f,E(a1), E(a2), · · · , E(aℓ), PK
Output: f(a1, a2, · · · , aℓ)
1: Client computes C = f(E(a1), E(a2), · · · , E(aℓ))
2: Client and Server run Algorithms 2-4
3: Client obtainsm = RR(R,PK, s)
4: return m
Theorem 3 In Algorithm 6,m = f(a1, a2, · · · , aℓ).






























































ProofBecause the BGN cryptosystem allows the evaluation of multi-
variate polynomials of total degree 2 on encrypted values and the
degree of the function f is less than 2, we have that
C = f(E(a1), E(a2), · · · , E(aℓ)) = E(f(a1, a2, · · · , aℓ)).
Based on Theorem 1, we have that
m = Decrypt(C, SK) = f(a1, a2, · · · , aℓ).
The theorem is proved. △




In this section, we analyse the security of our Private Cell Re-
trieval protocol (PCR) in terms of the server’s security and the
client’s security defined in Section IV. We consider the server’s se-
curity at first.
In our scenario, the server wishes to make profit through data
warehouse services. The business model is most likely that the
server charges the client per query. In other word, the server reveals
one measure value only in each client query. In order to prevent the
client from knowing all data in the data warehouse without paying
queries, the server encrypts the data warehouse with the BGN cryp-
tosystem [4], where the decryption key is known the server only.
The security of the BGN cryptosystem is built on the subgroup
decision problem: With reference to Appendix, let k ∈ Z+ and
let (q1, q2,G,G1, e) be a tuple produced by KeyGen(k) where
N = q1q2. Given (N,G,G1, e) and an element x ∈ G, output 1 if
the order of x is q1 and output 0 otherwise; that is, without knowing
the factorization of the group order N , decide if an element x is in
a subgroup of G.
We say thatKeyGen(k) satisfies the subgroup decision assump-
tion if for any polynomial time algorithmA, the advantage ofA in
solving the subgroup decision problem,
|Pr(A(N,G,G1, e, x) = 0)− Pr(A(N,G,G1, e, x) = 1)|,
is a negligible function in k.
In [4], it has been shown that the BGN scheme is semantically
secure ifKeyGen(k) satisfies the subgroup decision assumption.
Theorem 4 IfKeyGen(k) satisfies the subgroup decision assump-
tion in the BGN scheme, the server in our Private Cell Retrieval
(PCR) protocol has the semantic security.
Proof Please refer to [4] for the proof that the BGN scheme is se-
mantic security if KeyGen(k) satisfies the subgroup decision as-
sumption.
Slightly different from the BGN scheme, we replace h with h1
in the public key and include e(g, g)q1 as a public parameter. Be-
cause h1 = e(g, h), the replacement does not affect the security
of the BGN scheme. In addition, it is hard to determine q1 from
e(g, g)q1 because the discrete logarithm is hard, and e(g, g)q1 does
not help to solve the subgroup decision problem at all, i.e., to de-
cide if xq1 = 1 given an element x. Therefore, the definition for the
server’s security is the same as the semantic security of the BGN
scheme and the theorem is proved. △
Next, we analyse the client’s security. Based on the definition of
client’s security, we consider the following game:
(1) Given the public/private key pair (PK,SK) of the BGN
cryptosystem, the adversary A chooses two different cipher-
texts C1 and C2, and then sends them to the challenger C.
(2) The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and
executes the Query Generation (QG) to obtain (Qb, sb) =
QG(Cb, PK). According to Algorithm 2, if C ∈ G,




if C ∈ G1,




where sb, rb are randomly chosen from {1, 2, · · · , N − 1}
and known to the challenger C. Then Qb is sent back to A.
(3) The adversary A can experiment with the code of Qb in an
arbitrary non-black-box way, and finally outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Theorem 5 The client in our Private Cell Retrieval (PCR) protocol
has the semantic security.
Proof In Step 2 of the above game, the ciphertext Cb is blinded
by random e(g, g))sbhrb1 . Without knowledge of random sb, rb,
the adversary A cannot tell which ciphertext is blinded even if
A can apply the decryption key SK on Cb in Step 3 to obtain
Rb = e(g, g)
q1mbe(g, g)q1sb wheremb = Decrypt(Cb, SK). In
view of this, the adversaryA’s advantage in this game (AdvA(k) =
|Pr(b′ = b)−1/2|) is negligible. Therefore, the theorem is proved.
△
Remark. In Algorithm 2, if C ∈ G, the client generates the query
Q in G by letting Q = Cgshr where s, r are randomly chosen
from {1, 2, · · · , N − 1} and sends the query Q to the server. But
this may leak to the server the client’s intention, such that retrieving
a cell or performing statistical analysis. Therefore, in order to keep
the client’s intention private, the client has to generate the query Q
in G1 no matter whether C ∈ G or C ∈ G1 as in Algorithm 2.
4.2 Performance Analysis
The core of our solution is our Private Cell Retrieval (PCR) pro-
tocol, composed of Query Generation, Response Generation and
Response Retrieval. Before the client and the server can run the
PCR protocol, the server is required to encrypt the whole data ware-
houseD in Algorithm 1 and distribute it to the client. This initiali-
sation costs O(|D|) computation complexity and O(|D|) commu-
nication complexity in the server, andO(|D|) communication com-
plexity in the client. This initialisation happens only once. Then
the client and the server can run our PCR protocol any number of
times.
In the query generation (Algorithm 2) of our PCR protocol, the
client generates a query (Q, s) with at most two exponentiations in
G1 and one pairing, and sends a group element of G1 to the server.
In the response generation (Algorithm 3), the server receives a
group member of G1 and generates a response R with one expo-
nentiation in G1 and then replies a group element of G1 to the
client.
In the response retrieval (Algorithm 4), after receiving a group
element of G1, the main time of the client is spent on determining
the discrete logarithm m = loge(g,g)q1 R
′ with Porland’s lambda
method [25]. The computation complexity of Porland’s lambda
method is
√
T where T is the upbound ofm.
Computation of exponentiations and pairings and communica-
tions of group elements of G1 can be very fast. Thus, the main
running time of our PCR protocol is O(
√
T ). If T is around 232,
the computation complexity is around 216 = 65536.
Next, we analyse the performance of private OLAP operations.
The computation complexity for the client to perform drill-down,
slice, dice, drill-down or pivot operation on the encrypted data cube






























































is the same as that of the same operation on the original data cube.
In Algorithm 5, assume that the domain for the dimension yj in-
cludes λ different values, then the computation complexity of the
roll-up operation isO(λ) group multiplications, which can be done
very quickly.
At last, we analyse the performance of our private statistical anal-
ysis. In Algorithm 6, to evaluate a ℓ-variate polynomial f(x1, x2,
· · · , xℓ) of total degree 2 at a point (a1, a2, · · · , aℓ), the client and
the server need jointly to run our PCR protocol once. For this eval-
uation, the client and the server can also run our PCR protocol ℓ
times to retrieve a1, a2, · · · , aℓ at first and then the client com-
putes f(a1, a2, · · · , aℓ) locally. Assume that the upbound of xi
(where 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) is T , then the upbound of f(x1, x2, · · · , xℓ)
is about T 2. In this case, the main running time of Algorithm 6
is about O(T ) while the main running time of ℓ PCR protocols is
about O(ℓ
√
T ), usually less than O(T ). However, the client in Al-
gorithm 6 needs to pay once while running ℓ PCR protocols needs
to pay ℓ times. Therefore, our private statistical analysis Algorithm
6 has the lowest cost.
To balance the cost and the running time for private statistical
analysis, the client may retrieve a part of (a1, a2, · · · , aℓ) and then
run Algorithm 6. The cost and running time are inversely propor-
tional. We can see that if the client wishes to perform statistical
analysis on the data warehouse with less cost, he has to spend more
time to get the result. If the client wishes to perform statistical anal-
ysis on the data warehouse with less time, he has to pay more to get
the result.
To the best of our knowledge, our solution is only one to provide
private OLAP operations. In our solution, our private cell retrieval
(PCR) protocol is essentially a private information retrieval (PIR)
protocol. Unlike existing PIR protocols, such as [21, 5, 12], our
PCR protocol needs to communicate the encrypted data warehouse
in the initialisation to enable private OLAP operations. This hap-
pens only once. Without considering the initialisation, the perfor-
mance comparison of our PCR protocol with some single database
PIR protocols are listed in TABLE 1.
Table 1: Performance Comparison
Protocols Comm. Comp.
Complexity Complexity
KO[21] O(|D|ǫ) client O(|D|ǫ)
any ǫ > 0 server O(|D|/2)
CMS[5] O(log8 |D|) client O(log |D|)
server O(|D|/2)














From TABLE 1, we can see that our PCR protocol is more effi-
cient than other single database PIR protocols in terms of commu-
nication if we do not consider the initialisation. In addition, only
our solution supports private OLAP operations.
Compared with a centralised data warehouse which supports OLAP
operations, our solution has two advantages as follows:
• A centralised data warehouse cannot protect the privacy of
OLAP operations required by the client even if PIR may be
used to prevent the server from knowing the final cell re-
trieved by the client. Our solution can protect the privacy of
both OLAP operations performed by the client and the final
cell retrieved by the client.
• A centralised data warehouse is inefficient when multiple
clients concurrently perform OLAP operations in the server
and run PIR with the server. Our solution is distributed and
the client can perform OLAP operations in his local com-
puter and only run our efficient PCR with the server.
Remark. We should point out that our solution may not be suit-
able for operational databases which need to update their data fre-
quently. This will require our solution to run initialisation many
times and leads the performance of our solution worse than oth-
ers. Our solution is in particular suitable for data warehouse where
the data is non-volatile. In this scenario, our solution needs to run
initialisation only once.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the practice of our solution, we have done
some experiments on the Oracle global data warehouse example1,
which has four dimensions, Channel, ShipTo, Product and Time,
and a units fact table storing three measures, units, sales and cost.
The date cube keeps 9 years sale history data and contains about
300,000 cells. Our experiment is executed on a desktop machine
with a Intel Core i7-2600 processor, which has a clock speed of
3.40GHz, and 16GB of RAM, and we use SQL and C programming
language.
First of all, we implemented the BGN cryptosystem [4], in which
the elliptic curve structures G,G1 and associated bilinear pairing
e are provided by the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library2.
For the public/private key pair (PK,SK) wherePK = {N,G,G1,
e, g, h1, e(g, g)
q1}, N = q1q2, h1 = e(g, uq2) and SK = {q1},
we use the values in Table 2.
In our setting, we choose the two primes q1 and q2, each has
roughly 512 bits in length, so that it is impossible to factorize N
according to the current computing technology.
Based on the BGN cryptosystem, we encrypt all measure values
in the units fact table. This initialisation takes about 5 hours. The
size of the original data cube is 45 Mbytes while the size of the
encrypted data cube becomes 850 Mbytes.
Remark In practice, a data warehouse is a very sparse multi- di-
mensional data set. In this case, the size of the encrypted data cube
can be significantly reduced because only the measures with values
need to be encrypted.
Based on the encrypted data cube E(D), we have done four ex-
periments described in what follows. The goal of these experiments
is to determine the actual times required by various OLAP oper-
ations, from the most simple, that is, retrieving a single cell, to
the most complex ones, such as performing regression analysis and
variance analysis.
Experiment 1 (Private Cell Retrieval) Consider the ciphertext C in
Table 3 which is the encrypted value of a cell the user wants to re-
trieve. To do so, the client generates a query (Q, s) = QG(C,PK)
with values ofQ and s shown in Table 3, and sendsQ to the server.
The server generates a response R = RG(Q,SK) as shown in
Table 3 and turns R to the client.

































































































































































































































The total running time of this cell retrieval operation performed
using our PCR protocol is about 1.14 seconds.
Experiment 2 (Private OLAP operations) Given the encrypted data
warehouse, the client performs a slice operation implemented by
the following SQL query:
CREATE VIEW Catalogues AS
SELECT ShipTo, Product, Time, units, sales, cost
FROM units_fact_table
WHERE Channel=“CAT"
where “CAT" stands for Catalogues. The resulting Catalogues view
is a 3-dimension subcube, from which the client further performs a
slice operation implemented by the following SQL query,
CREATE VIEW Mouse AS
SELECT ShipTo, Time, units, sales, cost
FROM Catalogues
WHERE Product=“MOUSE”
The resulting Mouse view is a 2-dimension subcube, from which
the client further performs a roll-up operation along the ShipTo
dimension from customer to all (i.e., aggregating three measures
units, sales and cost for all customers), and then a roll-up opera-
tion along the time dimension from month to year (i.e., aggregating
three measures units, sales and cost from months into years), with
Algorithm 5 implemented by the C programming language.
At last, the client obtains a subcube with only the Time dimen-
sion Time, which takes values in the set {0, 1, · · · , 9}.
The total running time for the above sequential OLAP operations
is less than 3 minutes.
RemarkWe can speed up our roll-up operation by parallel compu-
tation. For example, if we allocate the task for the roll-up operation
to multiple computers and run 5 computers in parallel, the total run-
ning time for the above experiment can be reduced from 3 minutes
to 36 seconds.
Experiment 3 (Private Regression Analysis) The sequence of the
OLAP operations in Experiment 2 restricts and shapes the data
warehouse so that it is ready for a regression analysis, by which the
client would like to investigate the relationship between the number
of sold mouse units and the time.
Consider the 1-dimension subcube that resulted from the sequen-
tial OLAP operations in Experiment 2, and assume that the units
measure takes values E(Y1), E(Y2), · · · , E(Yn) in yearsX1, X2,
· · · , Xn, respectively.
A simple regression analysis is to determine b0 and b1 in the




i=1(Xi −X)(Yi − Y )∑n
i=1(Xi −X)2










GivenX1, X2, · · · , Xn andE(Y1), E(Y2), · · · , E(Yn), to com-
pute b0, b1, the client gets
∏n
i=1 E(Yi) = E(
∑n
i=1 Yi) decrypted
by our PCR protocol and then computesX and Y . Next, let [X], [Y ]
be the round results of X,Y (note that the number of sold units is
























Then the client gets Z decrypted by our PCR protocol and then
computes b1 = Decrypt(Z, SK)/
∑n
i=1(Xi − [X])2 and b0 =
Y − b1X .
By the above private regression analysis, we obtain the linear
equation
Y = 9407.33− 658.08X.
This result is very close to the actual linear equation Y = 9407.67
−658.08X obtained by performing the regression analysis on the
plain data warehouse. In addition, our private regression analysis
needs two decryptions only.
Remark. The difference between two linear equations is due to the
round operation.
Experiment 4 (Private Variance Analysis) Consider the 1-dimension
subcube that resulted from the sequential OLAP operations in Ex-
periment 2, i.e., X1, X2, · · · , Xn (years) and E(Y1), E(Y2), · · · ,
E(Yn) (encrypted units), and suppose that the client would like to
compute the variance for units measure in private.
The variance v2 can be computed as follows:
v2 =
∑n













FromE(Y1), E(Y2), · · · , E(Yn), the client can obtainE(nYi−∑n











where e denotes the pairing operation (please refer to Appendix).




























where E denotes the BGN encryption over G1 (please refer to Ap-
pendix).






























































Next, the client gets Z decrypted by our PCR protocol and com-
putes v2 = Decrypt(Z, SK)/n3.
By the above private variance computation, the client obtains the
variance v2 = 3212337.56 for units measure with only one decryp-
tion. This result is the same as the actual variance by performing
the variance analysis on the plain data warehouse.
Remark. If our underlying encryption scheme were the ElGamal
scheme [11] or Paillier scheme [30] instead of the BGN scheme [4],
the private variance analysis in Experiment 4 would have needed 9
decryptions instead of 1 decryption.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a solution for private data ware-
house queries. Our solution allows the client to perform OLAP
operations, such as roll-up, drill-down, dice, slice, pivot, and then
retrieve a cell from the resulted data warehouse without revealing to
the server what operations are performed and what cell is retrieved.
In particular, our solution allows the client to perform some statisti-
cal analysis on the data warehouse with the lowest cost if the server
charges the client per query.
Our solution provides not only the client’s security but also the
server’s security. Performance analysis and experiments have shown
that our solution is practical for private data warehouse queries.
So far, our solution only allows the client to privately perform
statistical analyses which can be algebraically expressed as a poly-
nomial of degree at most 2 on the data warehouse, such as regres-
sion and variance analysis. Our future work will extend our so-
lution so that the client can privately perform statistical analyses
which cannot be algebraically expressed as a polynomial, such as
min, max and count.
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We introduce the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [4] in this
section.
A.1 Bilinear Group
We use the following notations:
1. G andG1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of finite order
n.
2. g is a generator of G.
3. e is a bilinear map e : G × G → G1. In other words, for all
u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab. We
also require that e(g, g) is a generator of G1.
We sat thatG is a bilinear group if a groupG1 and a bilinear map
as above exist.
A.2 Boneh-Goh-Nissim Encryption Scheme
Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption scheme, BGN scheme by brevity,
resembles the Paillier [30] and the Okamoto-Uchiyama [28] en-
cryption schemes. The three algorithms making up the scheme are
described as follows:
A.2.1 Key Generation KeyGen(k)
Given a secure parameter k ∈ Z+, run KeyGen(k) to obtain
a tuple (q1, q2,G,G1, e). Let N = q1q2. Pick up two random
generators g, u from G and set h = uq2 . Then h is a random
generator of the subgroup of G of order q1. The public key is
PK = {N,G,G1, e, g, h}. The private key SK = q1.
A.2.2 Encryption Encrypt(m,PK)
Assume the message space consists of integers in the set {0, 1, · · · ,
T} with T < q2. We encrypt bits in which case T = 1. To en-
crypt a messagem using the public key PK, pick a random r from
{1, 2, · · · , N} and compute
C = gmhr ∈ G (1)
Output C as the ciphertext.
A.2.3 Decryption Decrypt(C, SK)
To decrypt a ciphertext C using the private key SK = q1, ob-
serve that
Cq1 = (gmhr)q1 = (gq1)m
To recover the message m, it suffices to compute the discrete log-
arithm of Cq1 to the base gq1 . Since 0 ≤ m ≤ T , this takes
expected time O(
√
T ) using Polland’s lambda method [25].
A.3 Homomorphic Properties
The BGN scheme is clearly additively homomorphic. LetPK =
{N,G,G1, e, g, h} be a public key. Given two ciphertextsC1, C2 ∈
G of messages m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T} respectively, anyone can
create a uniformly distributed encryption ofm1 +m2(mod N) by
computing the product C = C1C2h
r for a random r in {1, 2, · · · ,
N − 1}.
More importantly, anyone can multiply two encrypted messages
once using the bilinear map. Let g1 = e(g, g) and h1 = e(g, h),
then g1 is of order N and h1 is of order q1. There is some (un-
known) α ∈ Z such that h = gαq2 . Suppose that we are given two
ciphertexts C1 = g
m1hr1 ∈ G and C2 = gm2hr2 ∈ G. To build
an encryption of the product m1m2(mod N), (1) pick a random
r ∈ ZN , and (2) let C = e(C1, C2)hr1 ∈ G1. Then
C = e(C1, C2)h
r
1
= e(gm1hr1 , gm2hr2)hr1




where r+m1r2+m2r1+αq2r1r2 is distributed uniformly in ZN .
Thus C is a uniformly distributed encryption of m1m2(mod N),
but in G1 rather than G. We note that the BGN scheme is still
additively homomorphic in G1.
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